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INTERPRETIVE-REGIME CHANGE
PhilipP. Frickey*
Dissenting in Chisom v. Roemer,1 Justice Scalia provided the
clearest judicial exposition of his approach to statutory interpretation:
I thought we had adopted a regular method for interpreting
the meaning of language in a statute: first, find the ordinary
meaning of the language in its textual context; and second,
using established canons of construction, ask whether there
is any clear indication that some permissible meaning other
than the ordinary one applies. If not-and especially if a
good reason for the ordinary2 meaning appears plain-we
apply that ordinary meaning.
Justice Scalia's suggestion of a well-settled approach to
statutory interpretation was incorrect, as he surely knew. A halfcentury ago, Henry Hart and Albert Sacks bluntly denied any such
consensus,3 and their conclusion remains true today.4 Indeed, it
*

Richard W. Jennings Professor of Law, University of California at

Berkeley (Boalt Hall). In some portions of this essay, I have drawn upon my
earlier work, including that collaboratively done with Bill Eskridge and Beth
Garrett. Dan Farber, Beth Garrett, Anne Joseph, Robert Post, and Nancy
Staudt provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
1. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
2. Id. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
3. They stated: "The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have
no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory
interpretation." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). A few years after
Chisom, Justice Scalia quoted this passage in an essay that provides much of
the fodder for my analysis later in this piece. See Antonin Scalia, CommonLaw Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION
3, 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
4. See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Revisiting the Revival of Theory in Statutory
Interpretation:A Lecture in Honor of Irving Younger, 84 MINN. L. REV. 199,

219-20 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court's consideration of formalist and
anti-formalist factors).
1971

1972

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 38:1971

remains even truer today, in large part, because of Justice Scalia and
his intellectual cousins.
Developing a theory that has been aptly labeled "the new
textualism," 5 Justice Scalia has proposed moving away from a
number of practices that federal judges have routinely undertaken for
the past generation in interpreting statutes. For example, since the
New Deal, the Supreme Court has freely consulted legislative history
in informing itself about the congressional intent surrounding a
statute.6 Scalia and others have argued that this is not only a bad
idea, it is even arguably unconstitutional because it subverts the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment through which
Congress must express its intent.7 Many of the Court's prominent
opinions have taken a purposive approach to statutory interpretation,
moving away from first-best textual meaning so that the statute
achieves the goals envisioned by Congress. 8 Scalia has contended
that this constitutes a reprehensible rewriting of statutes9 contrary to
constitutional structure and the ideal ofjudicial restraint.
Moreover, some of Scalia's compatriots would go even beyond
where he has seen fit to tread. For example, Scalia has been willing
to apply the absurd-result exception to textual meaning.' 0 In contrast, Professor John Manning, probably the leading scholarly
textualist, would abolish the absurd-result exception as another toomalleable tool available for judicial rewriting of statutes."1
5. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621,
623 (1990).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Am.Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 542-43
(1940).
7. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism as a NondelegationDoctrine, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 673, 674-75 (1997); Scalia, supra note 3, at 29-37.
8. Perhaps the most visible, and controversial, opinion of statutory
interpretation in the modem era is United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979), holding that despite the literal meaning of Title VII, an employer may
use a racial classification in an affirmative-action plan because doing so
furthers the purpose of the statute.
9. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-17 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
10. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-30
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (applying absurd-result
exception to plain meaning with the limitation that the rewriting of the statute
"does least violence to the text").
11. See John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv.
2387, 2454-56 (2003).
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Moreover, when writing in a scholarly rather than judicial venue,
Scalia himself has expressed strong doubts about most of the policybased canons of statutory interpretation, 12 even though in his Chisom
3
dissent he seems to view them as essential parts of his enterprise.'
The new textualism's likelihood of success remains uncertain at
best. Currently, there is only one other disciple on the Supreme
Court, Justice Thomas.' 4 Additionally, the Court has squarely
rejected the contention that it should have an exclusionary rule
15
concerning the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation.
Thus, the effect of the new textualism on the Court has been more
subtle. The Court has tempered its use of legislative history and
purposive interpretation, without completely abandoning them.16
To be sure, there are influential lower-court federal judgesmost prominently, Judge Easterbrook' 7-- who have embraced the
new textualism. Moreover, in the academy, Professor Manning and
a few others, such as Professor John Nagle,' 8 have aligned with the
cause and contributed important scholarship. Although academe
likely remains in the hands of soft-headed antiformalists for the
foreseeable future, it is harder to foresee the evolution of the federal
judiciary. For now, however, the new textualism tends to exist in the
occasional majority opinion by Scalia or Thomas, in the relatively
infrequent judicial interchange between lower-court judges like
Easterbrook and their more antiformalist judicial colleagues, 19 and in
law review articles.
Despite nearly two decades of textualist assault, a longstanding
cluster of eclectic interpretive practices-a20 balancing of textual,
institutional, and purposive considerations -seems to have re12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See Scalia,supra note 3, at 25-29.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 4, at 205.
See Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991).
See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH

GARRETr,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE

CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

768-69 (3d ed. 2001).

17. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 4, at 202.
18. See, e.g., John Nagle, Textualism's Exceptions, 3 ISSUES IN LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIP 15 (Nov. 2002), at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art 15.
19. Compare, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (Easterbrook, J.), with id. at 1331-38 (Posner, J., dissenting).
20. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretationas PracticalReasoning,42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 345-53 (1990).
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mained largely intact. However, this pragmatic approach-the
current "interpretive regime," 21 if you will-will undoubtedly be
under continued pressure from textualism. In this essay, I consider
some of the barriers that textualism will encounter as its supporters
continue their attempts to implement the approach. I suggest some
theoretical, doctrinal, and practical problems that could bedevil even
the most committed believer in interpretive-regime change.
I. THE PROBLEM WITH PRECEDENT: AN ILLUSTRATION
Chisom v. Roemer,2 2 the case from which I quoted Scalia's
textualist methodology, provides a useful place to begin the analysis.
The case concerned Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which
outlaws a state or local electoral process that "results in a denial or
23
abridgement of the right... to vote on account of race or color."
The statute goes on to explain that a violation "is established" if
members of the protected class "have less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and
to elect representatives of their choice." 24 Chisom turned on whether
of state supreme court judges-i.e.,
this language covers the election
25
are judges "representatives"?
For Scalia, the evident answer is that the language does not
cover judicial elections because elected judges are not "representatives." Applying his textualist approach, Scalia turned to the
dictionary in concluding that "[t]here is little doubt that the ordinary
meaning of 'representatives' does not include judges." 26 He explained that "the word 'representative' connotes one who is not only
elected by the people, but who also, at a minimum, acts on behalfof
the people." 27 In contrast, "the judge represents the Law-which

21. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation,
and the Rule ofLaw, in THE RULE OF LAW 265, 267 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
22. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).

23. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2001).
24. Id.
25. I simplify here. It was conceded that judicial elections were subject to
the first clause of the last quoted language concerning participation in the

political process. The question was whether the second clause, involving
electing "representatives," also reached such elections.
26. Chisom, 501 U.S. at 410 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
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28
often requires him to rule against the People."
Justice Stevens's majority opinion rejected this conclusion
because it was inconsistent with the broad, purposive interpretive
methodology used in earlier Voting Rights Act cases. Consider this
passage:
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for the
broad remedial purpose of "rid[ding] the country of racial
discrimination in voting." South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966). In Allen v. State Board of
Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969), we said that the Act
should be interpreted in a manner that provides "the broad29
est possible scope" in combating racial discrimination.
Justice Scalia responded that "Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act... is not some all-purpose weapon for well-intentioned judges
to wield30as they please in the battle against discrimination. It is a
statute."
Note that Scalia did not-indeed, could not-deny the language
quoted from earlier cases. Instead, he suggested that the language
simply has no binding force on the Court.
Is this consistent with the doctrine of precedent? As I shall
explain, strictly speaking, the answer is yes. But it is in great tension
with the practices of judges and lawyers.
The place to start is with the precedent that Justice Stevens
strongly relied upon when interpreting the Voting Rights Act as
broadly as possible in combating racial discrimination in elections.
Allen v. State Board of Elections3 1 is not only the first important
statutory interpretation case decided under the statute, it is arguably
the most important one. It arose just four years after Congress
adopted the 1965 statute, long before the 1982 amendments that
transformed section 2 into an important vehicle for attacking existing
electoral processes that had discriminatory effects. Among other
important holdings in his Allen majority opinion, Chief Justice
Warren concluded that there was an implied private right of action
for the enforcement of section 5 of the Act, which prohibits
jurisdictions covered by that provision from changing electoral

28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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processes without first obtaining federal administrative or judicial
preclearance. 32 Without private enforcement, the statute would
likely have been far less successful in transforming racial politics in
the South. Based on the "weight of the legislative history and an
analysis of the basic purposes of the Act," 33 the Court in Allen also
held that preclearance applied to "any state enactment which altered
the election law of a covered State in even a minor way." 34 The
Court supported this holding in part by understanding the legislative
and drafting history of the statute as "[i]ndicative
of an intention to
35
scope."
possible
broadest
the
give the Act
Technically speaking, the principle of stare decisis applies only
to the holdings in Allen. In the context of statutory interpretation, the
cases say this presumption of continuing validity is extremely
strong.36 Thus, it is very unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever
revisit the holdings in Allen in a serious way. This remains so, even
though, for example, the Court's approach to the implied-cause-ofaction issue has changed dramatically, such that had Allen been
litigated 37today, the outcome on that question might well be
different.
Everything else in Allen is dictum. Thus, the very use of
legislative history and purposivism in the interpretive process, much
less the statements concerning how courts should give the statute
"the broadest possible scope," are not binding on the Supreme Court
or even on lower courts. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the
dictum in Allen is potentially important, as illustrated by considering
several examples of ever-broadening scope.
First, consider the likely effect of the dictum on later cases
involving section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, the provision
interpreted in Allen. Lower courts, attorneys, and anyone else
interested in that provision will read Allen not simply for its
32. See id. at 555.
33. Id. at 569.
34. Id. at 566.
35. Id. at 566-67.
36. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
OverrulingStatutoryPrecedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361 (1988).
37. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redlington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)
(moving away from free implication of private rights of action whenever they
would serve statutory purposes and focusing instead on specific indications of
congressional intent).
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holdings, but also for its attitude. Allen would likely provide the
paradigmatic example of what interpreting section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act is supposed to involve. And so it is unsurprising that, in
later section 5 cases, both the Supreme Court and lower courts have
quoted the expansive language and used it to structure the analysis of
other section 5 questions.38
Second, and a bit more broadly, consider the likely effect of the
language in Allen in later cases involving other provisions of the
Voting Rights Act. Chisom is a perfect example. Chisom involved
section 2 of the statute as amended in 1982, thirteen years after the
Supreme Court decided Allen. Thus, the Court in Allen could not
have directly contemplated that its attitude about the statute would
influence a provision not yet in meaningful existence.39 Yet the
Court in Chisom fully embraced the Allen exuberance. Justice
Stevens's majority opinion explained why the Allen attitude actually
had a double-barreled significance-as expressing a penumbral
aspect of the statute from the start and as embodying an
understanding of its nature upon which Congress likely relied in
adopting the 1982 amendment. By returning to a passage already
quoted, but expanding upon it a bit, we can see how Stevens's
opinion weaves together the congressional and judicial work
concerning the statute into a coherent, purposive pattern:
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 for the
broad remedial purpose of "rid[ding] the country of racial
discrimination in voting." [South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966).] In [Allen], we said that the Act
should be interpreted in a manner that provides "the
broadest possible scope" in combating racial discrimination.
Congress amended the Act in 1982 in order to relieve
plaintiffs of the burden of proving discriminatory intent,
after a plurality of this Court had concluded that the original
Act, like the Fifteenth Amendment, contained such a
requirement. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
Thus, Congress made clear that a violation of § 2 could be
38. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468 (1987);
Lucas v. Townsend, 908 F.2d 851,856 (11 th Cir. 1990).
39. Section 2 was in the statute from its inception, but it had no independent
significance before the 1982 amendment. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55
(1980) (stating that § 2 simply mirrors the Fifteenth Amendment).
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established by proof of discriminatory results alone. It is
difficult to believe that Congress, in an express effort to
broaden the protection afforded by the Voting Rights Act,
withdrew, without comment,40 an important category of
elections from that protection.
Thus, as Stevens understood it, a shared congressional and
judicial understanding had developed concerning the ongoing
application of the Voting Rights Act. This attitude is one that
Congress presumably understood and relied upon when it amended
the statute in 1982, and one that remains vital to the judicial
interpretation of the statute. For Stevens, none of this is binding in
the strong sense of legal formalism. Instead, everything is situated,
persuasive, and largely entrenched by the pragmatic, repeat-game
partnership of the legislature and the judiciary in governing the
country.
And so, of course, it was perfectly legitimate for Justice Scalia,
in his dissent, to condemn the majority for "transform[ing] the
meaning of § 2... because it does not fit the Court's conception of
what Congress must have had in mind."4 1 No rule of law or judicial
custom stood in the way of his uttering a further complaint:
When we adopt a method that psychoanalyzes Congress
rather than reads its laws, when we employ a tinkerer's
toolbox, we do great harm. Not only do we reach the wrong
result with respect to the statute at hand, but we poison the
well of future legislation, depriving legislators of the
assurance that ordinary terms, used in an ordinary context,
will be given a predictable meaning. Our highest responsebility in the field of statutory construction is to read the
laws in a consistent way, giving Congress a sure means by
which it may work the people's will. We have ignored that
responsibility today.42
Nor, of course, did any rule of law or custom prevent a majority of
his colleagues from disagreeing with him about the outcome of the
case or the path chosen to get there.
As one encounters disputes more remote from the settings of
40. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 403-04 (1991).
41. Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

42. Id.
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Allen and Chisom, one would expect that the gravitational pull of the
interpretive regime applied to the Voting Rights Act would gradually
lose force. Take, for example, the question whether the "interpretation with attitude" approach should apply to the construction of
other civil rights statutes. There is no question that the Supreme
Court has sometimes viewed statutes like Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act through a similar attitudinal lens.43 But it would be
somewhat surprising for those decisions to put much weight on cases
like Allen or Chisom, or even to cite them. 44 Title VII has its own
local judicial knowledge, with a much greater gravitational impact.
As an illustration, consider a case that the Supreme Court
decided in the same term as Chisom. West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey45 involved 42 U.S.C. § 1988,46 the civil
rights attorney's fee-shifting statute. Section 1988 provides that
prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases may recover "a reasonable
attorney's fee." 47 The issue in Casey was whether the plaintiff could
recover amounts paid to experts.4 8 Prior to Casey, in a leading lower
court decision, Judge Posner took guidance from earlier Supreme
Court decisions taking a purposive approach to § 1988. He concluded that the award of expert fees was consistent with the statute's
essential purpose of making prevailing civil rights plaintiffs "whole"
and with an imaginative reconstruction of what the enacting
Congress would have wished.49
However, in Casey this purposive approach garnered the support
of only three Justices. 50 Instead, Justice Scalia's majority opinion
relied upon a "whole code" textualist approach. Some federal feeshifting statutes refer only to attorney's fees, while others contain
targeted language authorizing the recovery of fees for attorneys and
43. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (concluding
that the generally worded prohibition on discrimination in employment forbade
not just intentional discrimination, but the use of facially neutral criteria that
have a disparate impact upon a protected class).
44. See id. (failing to cite Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1969)).
45. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000).
47. Id.
48. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
49. See Friedrich v. Chicago, 888 F.2d 511,517-19 (7th Cir. 1989).
50. See Casey, 499 U.S. at 103-16 (Stevens, J., joined by Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
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expert witnesses. 5' Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that holding
attorney's fees to include expert fees would render "dozens of
statutes referring to the two separately an inexplicable exercise in
52
redundancy."
Taken together, Chisom and Casey illustrate many of the
barriers to interpretive-regime change. Sitting side by side, they
seem hopelessly inconsistent in both the method of statutory
interpretation in general and the approach to be undertaken with civil
rights statutes in particular.
In these cases, three groups of Justices emerged. Justice Stevens
(author of Chisom) dissented in Casey, and Justices Marshall and
Blackmun, who also joined the majority opinion in Chisom, joined
him. "The Stevens Three" took consistent purposivist approaches to
the interpretation of civil rights statutes that the Court had earlier
treated with that sort of attitude. As noted, Justice Scalia dissented in
Chisom and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy. These three Justices were in the majority in Casey. "The
Scalia Three" took consistent textualist stands.
But what of the three Justices-White, O'Connor, and Souterwho silently joined the majority opinions in both cases? The best
explanation for their votes is that they were not motivated by any
rigid theory of statutory interpretation. Instead, it seems that their
votes are best explained by a balancing process in which text,
legislative intent, purpose, and policy are all considered eclectically.53 For them, the inherited, embedded practice of statutory
interpretation, atheoretical as it might seem, was paramount to
overarching attempts to impose coherence.
Although it cannot be conclusively demonstrated empirically,54 I
51. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (2000).

52. Casey, 499 U.S. at 92.
53. Consistent with the eclectic approach identified in Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 20, these three centrist Justices seemingly took into account all
plausible sources of statutory meaning: text, congressional intent, statutory
purpose, and policy, in that order of primacy. On this understanding, their
votes inthe cases seem explicable because the textual argument-the most
concrete and powerful source of statutory meaning-dominated more in Casey
than in Chisom, while the purposive understanding of the Voting Rights Actinterpretation with attitude-was stronger than the purposive understanding of
the attorney's fees statute.
54. But cf Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory
Interpretation:An EmpiricalAnalysis, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1073 (1992) (eclectic
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believe that the views of the Justices in the middle, though arguably
muddled, represent the center of gravity in the federal and state
courts. Illustratively, Chisom has not prevented later Courts from
taking narrow approaches to the Voting Rights Act. 55 If an
interpretive regime is difficult to entrench with respect to particular
statutes, it is even less likely to take hold for particular categories of
statutes (here, civil rights statutes). It follows that such a regime is
extremely unlikely to create a broad seismic shift in statutory
interpretation.
This is not to say simply that the more things change, the more
they remain the same. The new textualism has not overtaken older
approaches, but it has subtly shifted those approaches. The Court
relies less on legislative history today than it did before Justice Scalia
arrived, and it cites dictionaries more frequently. 56 Moreover, no
good advocate before the Court today would focus an argument
almost exclusively on the legislative history (as many good
advocates did a generation ago). 5 In a sense, the Court has said that
while textualism is not a good all-embracing theory, it does make
some good points.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH TRANSPARENCY AND TRANSITION
Any interpretive regime worthy of respect should provide
transparency. The basic idea is that, from the cluster of plausible but
somewhat inconsistent approaches, the highest appellate court should
develop a predictable and settled methodology. If the regime's
jurisprudence is transparent to the legislature, legislative staff should
be able to draft statutes so that legislators can carry out their related
business. For example, legislators can develop legislative history
with a reasonable degree of certainty about its likely judicial
reception down the road. Indeed, for Justice Scalia, transparency in
interpretive method is supposedly the fundamental idea. Recall that
factors are routinely taken into account in judicial opinions involving statutory
interpretation).
55. See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003).
56. See, e.g.,ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETr, supra note 16, at 768-71.
For an example of the abandoned strategy, note that the briefs in the famous

Weber affirmative action case focused almost exclusively on the legislative
history, not on statutory text. See Philip P. Frickey, Wisdom on Weber, 74
TuL. L. REv. 1169, 1178 (2000).
57. See id.
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in his Chisom dissent he stated: "Our highest responsibility in the
field of statutory construction is to read the laws in a consistent way,
giving Congress a sure means by which it may work the people's
will.",5 8 A corollary is that the method must be sufficiently transparent so that courts can predictably follow it as well.
In this light, there are significant transition costs associated with
interpretive-regime change. Obviously, even the most competent
legislature can only accommodate an interpretive regime that is
transparent and entrenched at the time the legislature acts. From the
1940's 9 until at least the late 1980's,60 Congress could rely on the
federal courts' receptivity to legislative intent expressed in what the
courts had viewed as the more authoritative and reliable sources of
legislative history-primarily, committee reports and statements of
officials actively involved in the legislative effort. 6 1 Ignoring the
legislative history of § 1988, as Justice Scalia did in Casey, violated
the interpretive regime that had been in place in 1976, when
Congress adopted the fee-shifting statute. Justice Stevens was
correct when he stated in his Casey dissent that Congress would have
expected § 1988 to be interpreted in light of its text, purpose, and
legislative history, not in light of how its text, standing alone,
cohered with text on62 similar subject matter scattered throughout the
United States Code.
Justice Scalia's dissent in Chisom presents an even more
dramatic challenge to an established interpretive regime. Ignoring
the legislative history of the Voting Rights Act (the initial version,
adopted in 1965, and the versions as amended in 1970, 1975, and
1982), as Scalia advocated in the Chisom case, would have done
violence to every expectation Congress had in each round of
legislation. Indeed, as Justice Stevens suggested in Chisom, when

58. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.

60. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97-100 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
61. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, supra note 16, at 947-49, 979-

81.
62. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 103, 112, 113,
116 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For broader theoretical support, see William W.

Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 149 U. PA. L.

REv. 171 (2000).
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Congress "broaden[ed] the protection afforded by the [statute]," 3 it
was writing against a backdrop of judicial decisions like Allen, which
could only be read as signalling that courts would interpret the
statute "ina manner that provides 'the broadest possible scope' in
combating racial discrimination." 64 Although there is no way to be
certain, the extreme degree to which this purposive interpretive
regime was tied to the Voting Rights Act may well have helped
persuade the centrist Justices to join Stevens rather than Scalia. The
Voting Rights Act is widely understood to be the most effective civil
rights statute adopted by Congress-a truly transformative measure
that destroyed much of the de facto remnants of Jim Crow laws by
promoting democratic political empowerment. It comes as no great
surprise, then, that even centrist Justices seem to approach it with
more than ordinary enthusiasm.
Justice Scalia has sometimes been somewhat sensitive to these
problems of transition and transparency. For example, in Franklinv.
Gwinnett County Public Schools, 65 he wrote separately to conclude
that his general aversion to implied rights of action should give way
in a circumstance in which Congress had acted against a clear
precedential backdrop where such rights were present. 66 This
approach is consistent with a basic notion of textualism-that a
statute be interpreted in light of "the conventions in effect at the time
of a statute's enactment." 67 He did not explain, however, why he
abandoned this approach in a later case involving implied causes of
action. 68 In any event, without some sensible approach to implementation in light of the concerns of transition and transparency,
imposing the new textualism entrenches one interpretive regime at
the cost of vitiating earlier reliance on its predecessor. Why the rule
of law is being promoted, rather than undermined, by such change is
unclear.
An excellent example of the institutional costs of regime change
in the context of another civil rights statute is Dellmuth v. Muth. 69 In
63. 501 U.S. at 404.
64. Id. at 403 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567
(1969)).
65. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
66. Id. at 77-78.
67. Manning, supra note 11, at 2474 n.318.
68. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
69. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
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1975, Congress enacted the Education of the Handicapped Act
("EHA"), 70 requiring local school systems to provide a free public
education to disabled children. The statute provided an express grant
of federal judicial jurisdiction to hear cases by dissatisfied parents,
and the legislative history made clear that such private parties should
be able to sue state governments. 7 1 Under the precedent of the era,
the statute would have most likely sufficed as a valid congressional
abrogation of the state's sovereign immunity to suit in federal court
under the Eleventh Amendment.
Then, in 1985, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,73 the
Court abandoned the jurisdictional-grant-plus-clear-legislativehistory approach, replacing it with a stringent "clear statement
rule." 74 Under Atascadero, a federal statute abrogates the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity only when Congress has made "its
intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." 75 Four
years later, in Dellmuth, the Court applied the new clear statement
rule to the EHA, holding that it had not abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 76 Adding institutional insult to injury, the
Court in Dellmuth pointed to a 1986 amendment where Congress, in
response to Atascadero, clearly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity for the EHA and other statutes.77 The Court did so as an
illustration that Congress knows how to abrogate when it wishes to
do so! Justice Scalia silently joined the majority opinion in
Dellmuth.
Transition and transparency are vitally important not only to
Congress, but also to the lower courts. One vivid example in which
the new textualism did not overcome these hurdles is Robinson v.
Shell Oil Co. 78 In that case, after Shell Oil discharged Robinson, he
70. Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975).
71. See Muth v. Central Bucks School Dist., 839 F.2d 113, 128 (3d Cir.
1988).
72. See Employees v. Mo. Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973).
73. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
74. For a discussion of clear statement rules, see William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear Statement Rules as
ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
75. 473 U.S. at 242.
76. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1989).
77. Id. at 231-32.
78. 519 U.S. 337 (1997), rev'g 70 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission contending that his firing violated Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196479 because it was racially motivated.80 At that
point, Shell Oil, supposedly in retaliation to Robinson's filing of the
complaint, gave negative job references to potential new
employers.8 1
Robinson sued under Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision, which makes it unlawful "for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment" who
took advantage of the statute's protections. 82 A majority of the
Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that Robinson could obtain no
relief, on the ground that the alleged retaliation was not against an
"employee" or an "applicant for employment," but instead against a
former employee. 83 The opinion tellingly noted that Title VII
84
defines "employee" as "an individual employed by an employer
and determined that Robinson did not easily fit within that definition
when the alleged retaliation occurred. 85 The judges acknowledged
that the result was odd from a policy standpoint and inconsistent with
a broad, purposive understanding of86Title VII, but concluded that the
statutory text compelled their result.
To my insufficiently indoctrinated eye, this approach struck me
as true textualism. The unanimous Supreme Court, however, disagreed and reversed the Fourth Circuit decision. 87 Justice Thomas,
of all people, wrote the opinion. 88 With a straight face, Thomas
found the statute ambiguous. 89 "[A]n individual employed by an
employer," he said, could mean "is employed...." or "was employed .... ,90 Finding himself free to roam beyond textual confinement, Thomas concluded that, in light of the remedial purposes
79. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
80. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 339.
81. Id.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
83. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 70 F.3d 325, 332 (4th Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
84. Id. at 329 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(f) (West 1994)).
85. Id. at 330.
86. See id. at 331-32.
87. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997), rev'g 70 F.3d 325 (4th
Cir. 1995) (en banc).
88. Id. at 338.
89. See id. at 341.
90. Id. at 342.
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of Title VII, applying the anti-retaliation provision to former as well
as current employees was appropriate. 91 Justice Scalia, of all people,
silently joined this opinion.
I'm confused. I would have thought the ordinary meaning of the
anti-retaliation provision-step 1 in Justice Scalia's formulation for
textualism-limits the category of "employees" to current employees
and applicants for employment, thus excluding former employees.
As someone not significantly confined by ordinary meaning, I would
cheerfully trump that source of interpretive information by
consulting the purpose of Title VII, which in my view easily
outweighs the importance of textual fidelity in this circumstance.
But in light of Scalia's dissent in Chisom, I thought recourse to
purpose-to the notion that Title VII was some all-purpose engine of
antidiscrimination and not merely statutory text, and to what attitude
Congress and prior courts had adopted to embrace Title VII as a
transformative, remedial statute-was forbidden to the textualist, at
least unless the statute was convoluted enough to have no relatively
straightforward, ordinary meaning. To be sure, denying a remedy to
former employees like Robinson seems perverse and arbitrary.
However, I think that it is no more so than saying that judicial
elections are somehow not subject to the full protections that the
Voting Rights Act provides to other elections.
Of course, I have selected a few examples that, in my opinion,
demonstrate serious problems with implementing regime change,
textualist style. A different set of examples, woven together by a
more sympathetic commentator, might well present a more
persuasive picture. In any event, however, lower court judges who
do not have a strong ideological stake in textualism cannot help but
remain puzzled-to put it politely-by this crazy-quilt pattern of
statutory interpretation.
Perhaps the missing link to a logical explanation is step 2 in
Justice Scalia's formulation in Chisom: applying established canons
of interpretation. The next Part addresses this approach.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH CANONS

The second part of Scalia's textualism formulation, described in
91. Id. at 345.
92. See id. at 338.
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his Chisom dissent, requires consideration of "established canons of
construction." 93 Canons come in three basic categories. 94 The first
set, textual canons, purport to provide guidance about the ordinary
meaning of statutory language. These well-known rules of thumb,
often embodied in Latinate shorthand-expressio unius, ejusdem
generis, noscitur a socciis, etc.-are easily compatible with Scalia's
Step 1 of textualism, which concentrates on ordinary textual meaning. Unsurprisingly, Scalia frequently resorts to these phrases. 95 The
second set of canons, the referential canons, directs courts to rely on
96
institutional sources of meaning that transcend the statutory text.
Common examples include canons concerning judicial deference to
administrative agency interpretation of statutes and established word
meanings at common law. These canons largely rise or fall on
institutional considerations that are beyond the scope of this essay.
The third set of canons-substantive, or policy-based, canonsinterest me here because they cause mischief for textualists.
Policy-based canons are just what you would expect: they
embody policies that judges impose as side constraints on statutory
meaning. These policies come from judicially accessible sources
such as the Constitution, common law, and common sense. 97 Wellknown examples include the rule of lenity, which counsels that
ambiguities in criminal statutes should be read in favor of the
defendant; 98 the canon that waivers of sovereign immunity should be
narrowly construed; 99 the canon that statutes benefiting seaworkers
are to be broadly construed; 00 and the canon that courts should avoid
a constitutional challenge to a statute if the law can be fairly
01
interpreted in a way that avoids the constitutional question.'
93. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETr, supra note 16, at 818-19.

95. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515
U.S. 687, 720-21 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (relying upon noscitur a
sociis).
96. See ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETr, supra note 16, at 818-19.

97. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,
137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989).
98. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETr, supra note 16, at 851-73.

99. See, e.g., id. at 849.
100. See, e.g., id. at 848.
101. See, e.g., id. at 873-79; Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene
(McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing

Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court 93 CAL. L. REv. 397, 399
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Policy-based canons operate as interstitial techniques of judicial
lawmaking at the margin of statutory meaning. Accordingly, one
would expect textualists to oppose policy-based canons just as much
as they purport to oppose other techniques of judicial evasion in
interpreting textual meaning. Here, however, the record is remarkably mixed.
Wearing his scholarly hat, Scalia has made the predictable
complaints. He has stated that "[t]o the honest textualist, all of these
preferential rules and presumptions are a lot of trouble." 102 He has
also contended that they increase the unpredictability of interpretation.' 0 3 Because there is no metric to decide how ambiguous a
statute must be to be "ambiguous," or how clear it must be to be
"clear," he has argued that one cannot easily predict when a canon
will be invoked. °4 When the Court applies a canon, Scalia has
stated that there is no way to know how narrow is "narrow" or how
broad is "broad."' 05 Moreover, he has suggested that there is a more
fundamental problem of determining "where the courts get the
authority to impose [the canon].' °6 He continues: "Can we really
just decree that we will interpret the laws that Congress passes to
mean less or more than what they fairly say? I doubt it."' ' Scalia
suggests that, while some of the policy-based canons may be
"validated by sheer antiquity"' 1 8 and others might be "exaggerated
produce
statement[s]" of what ordinary interpretation "would
' 10
1 0°9 others are just "judicial power-grab[s].""
anyway,'
As a justice, however, Scalia has used a variety of the common
policy-based canons, including the rule of lenity,"' the constitutional
avoidance canon, 1 2 and the sovereign immunity canon. 1 13 He has
(2005).
102. Scalia, supra note 3, at 28.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 29.
107. Id.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 246 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
112. See, e.g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 250
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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even written opinions that have used policy-based canons of the most
stringent variety, "clear statement rules." 114 Clear statement rules
hold that a statute cannot be given a certain meaning-for example,
that Congress intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity to suit in federal court-unless that understanding is
unmistakably clear in the statutory text." 5 Thus, clear statement
rules are the most abusive of ordinary textual meaning. As a justice,
Scalia has never explained why any policy-based canons, much less
clear statement rules, are appropriate in his interpretive scheme.
Professors Manning and Nagle have examined this tension most
vividly in their recent works urging the abolition of the absurd-result
exception to textual meaning."l 6 Quite logically, Manning criticizes
Justice Scalia's and Judge Easterbrook's use of a canon that cannot
be defended within a textualist framework.'
One possible explanation for the inconsistency between Scalia's
scholarly and judicial views on policy-based canons is that judges are
bound by the established rules of construction, whether they like
them or not. It is a mystery to me, however, why policy-based
canons should be more entrenched than the general, longstanding
interpretive practices that were in place when Scalia arrived at the
Supreme Court and that he has attacked at virtually every
opportunity.
Moreover, even if "established" canons are for some reason
entrenched, the notion that they can be distinguished from mere
pretenders is dubious. First, the particulars of even longstanding
canons drift over time. For example, the rule of lenity, which Scalia

113. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 34 (1992).
114. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 776
(1991).
115. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
116. See Manning, supra note 7; Nagle, supra note 18.
117. See Manning, supra note 7, at 685-705. Manning contends that the
absurdity canon is wrong in part because it functions as a surrogate for actual
legislative intent (the legislature would not have wanted an absurd outcome)
and that form of "strong intentionalism" violates textualist norms. See id. My
own view is that the absurdity canon is better understood as a policy-based
canon in which judges avoid absurdity not based on presumed legislative intent
but instead because of their own authority to make law as functional as
practicable. Under either understanding of the canon, however, it remains
inconsistent with true textualism.
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acknowledges might be entrenched by the sheer passage of time, 118 is
sometimes expressed as a presumption at the outset of the
interpretive process and, at other times, as a mere tiebreaker applied
at the end of the process."l 9 Accordingly, there may be no clarity at
any given time about these canonical details. To illustrate, the
Supreme Court recently split 5-4 in a rule-of-lenity case. 120 The
majority upheld the conviction by viewing the canon as a mere
tiebreaker, and the dissent voted to reverse the conviction by viewing
the canon as a presumption. 12 1 Obviously, this lack of predictability
and certainty undermines the idea that canons can limit judicial
discretion or channel legislative drafting. This concern is especially
evident when the Supreme Court suddenly elevates a weaker canon
into a clear statement rule, as the Court, with Scalia's consent, has
abrogation of the
done with the canon concerning congressional
122
court.
federal
in
suit
to
immunity
states'
Second, the Court occasionally creates new canons. This obviously raises concerns about transparency and transition, as
suggested earlier. 23 A true textualist might attempt to interpret a
statute by using the canons in play at the time it was enacted, as
Professor Manning has suggested. 124 The problems of figuring out
just what that involves would be difficult in many situations. In any
event, the Court establishes canons over time. For example, in 1989,
the Court announced that a "party contending that legislative action
changed settled law has the burden of showing that the legislature
intended such a change."' 125 The Court's only citation in support of
this approach was one case introduced by the signifier "Cf.,"
indicating that the case only indirectly supported the idea. 126 Six
years later, the Court treated this notion as an established canon of

118. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 29.

119. In addition to clear statement rules, presumptions and tiebreakers are
two other ways canons are commonly expressed. ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY &
GARRETr, supra note 16, at 850-51.
120. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
121. Compareid at 138-39, with id. at 148-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
122. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
123. See discussion supra Part II.
124. See Manning, supra note 7, at 692.

125. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989).
126. Id.
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interpretation, this time simply quoting the 1989 case. 127
Presumably, the thoughtful question is not whether this canon is
forbidden because it was not formally established in the time of John
Marshall. Instead, the question simply should be whether it is a
useful guideline for resolving an interpretive problem.
Issues of canonical entrenchment and evolution should also be
informed by the sources of the values served by the particular canon
in question. It is not surprising that even established canons evolve
over time. After all, many of them rest on sources that are inherently
evolutive, such as the common law or the Constitution. In particular,
many of the most important policy-based canons relate to the
Constitution. For instance, the canon that counsels to avoid constitutional questions authorizes courts to interpret a statute away
from constitutional difficulty and to use statutory interpretation as a
means to implement constitutional values. 128 The Court's relatively
recent creation of clear statement rules implemented to guard core
federalism values from inadvertent congressional intrusion is
designed to do the same thing. 129 In fact, the canons can serve to
protect "underenforced" constitutional norms13°0norms that are
either not directly enforced by judicial review at all,13 ' or are
132
strategically better enforced at the subconstitutional level.
Whether such canons are appropriate raises questions as much about
constitutional law as about statutory interpretation.
In short, the notion of a static set of entrenched policy-based
canons is a myth. It is obviously true, however, that there is a set of
policy-based canons. Although the details change, many of these
canons are quite entrenched into our case law. Scholar Scalia is right
to see them as problematic, yet Justice Scalia is right to use them in
127. Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 163 (1995) (quoting Bock
Laundry, 490 U.S. at 521).
128. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 101.
129. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 20.
130. For a foundational discussion, see Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair
Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms, 91 HARv.
L. REv. 1212 (1978).
131. For example, even when Congress has the constitutional authority to
enact legislation regulating core state functions, the statute will be read to that
effect only if it clearly so states. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460
(1991).
132. See Frickey, supra note 101.
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his cases without much hand wringing. For better or worse, using
canons is part of our normal science of statutory interpretation, a
practice to which the legal interpretive community is so acclimated
that it is part of what "doing statutory interpretation" is all about.
Therein lies an example of one of the most fundamental problems for
textualist regime change, as the next Part discusses.
IV. THE PROBLEM WITH LEGAL CULTURE

The book containing Scalia's lecture on statutory interpretation
and his response to critics is entitled "A Matter of Interpretation," a
cute pun. The essay based on his lecture, however, is itself entitled
"Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
133
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws."'
More clearly than any passage in the lecture, this title reveals
Scalia's most basic complaint about statutory interpretation in the
federal courts.
In the lecture, he deftly discusses the common-law mentality
that law schools imbue in their students. Scalia stresses that the great
common law judge is the person "who has the intelligence to discern
the best rule of law for the case at hand and then the skill to perform
the broken-field running through earlier cases that leaves him free to
impose that rule."' 134 The translation of this common-law mentality
to statutory interpretation piques Scalia. "All of this would be an
unqualified good, were it not for a trend in government that has
developed in recent centuries, called democracy."' 135 Scalia rightly
states: "We live in an age of legislation, and most new law is
statutory law."' 136 The work of the modem judge is the interpretation
of text produced by a democratic institution, not common law
broken-field running toward the end zone of good policy. This is
especially true in the federal courts, he continues, "where, with a
qualification so small it does not bear mentioning, there is no such
thing as common law."' 137 In the context of statutory interpretation,
his basic complaint is with "the attitude of the common-law judgethe mind-set that asks, 'What is the most desirable resolution of this
133. Scalia, supra note 3.
134. Id. at 9.

135. Id.
136. Id. at 13.
137. Id.
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case, and how can any impediments to the achievement of that result
be evaded?"",138 For Scalia, this attitude is not "appropriate for most
139
of the work that I do, and much of the work that state judges do."'
In my view, Scalia is absolutely right in getting at the core of the
problem he faces. It is a problem of legal culture, 140 and, I think, one
that he cannot overcome. As he humorously demonstrates, the
common-law mentality runs deep in American legal education. 141 To
be an American lawyer is to be someone who has survived boot
camp in the common law before learning more specialized doctrines
and skills. Scalia is correct that relatively few law students study
statutory interpretation as a separate subject.142 For the vast majority
138. Id.
139. Id. Scalia never explains exactly how the system in which he works is a
"civil law system." Scalia does contrast the presumptively binding nature of
precedent in a common law system with the civil law system, "where it is the
text of the law rather than any prior judicial interpretation of that text which
is authoritative." Scalia, supra note 3, at 7. His point appears to be purely
descriptive and by means of contrast, but the question remains whether, in his
ideal federal system, statutory interpretation decisions should not only be
governed by textual analysis, but available for reconsideration through textual
analysis.
140. In commenting upon Scalia's essay, Gordon Wood, the distinguished
historian, concluded:
Ultimately there seems to be no easy way to limit the judges'
interpretive power except by changing the attitude of judges
themselves (in effect, changing the judicial culture, which is what I
suppose Justice Scalia's essay is trying to do), or by appointing to the
bench only those judges having the attitude you want.
Gordon Wood, Comment, in A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at
49, 63.
141. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 9.
142. Although, in his typical, inimitable style, Scalia grossly overstates his
case:
[T]he American bar and American legal education, by and large, are
unconcerned with the fact that we have no intelligible theory [of
statutory interpretation]. Whereas legal scholarship has been at pains
to rationalize the common law ...it has been seemingly agnostic as to
whether there is even any such thing as good or bad rules of statutory
interpretation. There are few law-school courses on the subject, and
certainly no required ones ....
Scalia, supra note 3, at 14-15. This summary, largely accurate twenty years
ago (that is, a dozen years or so before Scalia was writing), completely misses
the explosion in statutory interpretation scholarship and pedagogy that began
in the late 1980's, which has included required courses at some law schools.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarhip
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of students, courses in tax, bankruptcy, and so on are about
substantive details and little, if at all, about how courts have used the
practices of statutory interpretation to resolve ambiguities within
those details. Moreover, even those law students who study statutory
interpretation as a discrete topic are likely to get mixed messagessome textualist, some nontextualist. 143 The thought that American
law schools will--or even could-train students to be true textualists
in the federal cases is beyond ken. The most law professors can do is
attempt to train students to make textualist, intentionalist, purposivist, and canonical arguments in analyzing statutory problems.
This would empower students to consider which approach(es) might
be compatible with our federal and state systems. Considering their
common law grounding, one should not be surprised if many, even
most, students consider textualism more of a useful skill for advocates than a plausible overarching theory.
Scalia is concerned with federal statutory interpretation. Indeed,
Professor Manning has extensively argued that the structure of the
federal constitution counsels, if not requires, textualism in federal
statutory interpretation. 44 For purposes of argument, assume that
the Constitution limits the judicial power of the United States in this
fashion. What about statutory interpretation in state courts? By that
rationale, statutory interpretation should vary from state to state,
depending upon local constitutional structures and values. This
conclusion is at once perfectly logical and simultaneously inconsistent with American legal culture. Consider the thought that a
statutory interpretation brief involving a similar statute and similar
issues should be structured and argued differently if filed in the state
district courts for Eskridge, Kansas; Garrett, Indiana; or Manning,
Iowa. 145 This notion would strike practicing attorneys and virtually
all state judges as pure nonsense. The highest courts of these states
are common law courts and have settled practices of statutory

and Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PrrT. L. REV. 691, 691

(1987); Frickey, supra note 4, at 222.
143. All of the major legislation casebooks present a variety of theoretical
and practical perspectives on statutory interpretation.

144. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-9 (2001).

145. All such towns exist. As Ring Lardner used to say, "you could look it

up.
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interpretation that are inconsistent with true textualism.146 In fact, I
would venture to say that law is just law for most practitioners and
judges, whether they practice in federal or state court.
Expecting this common law mentality to continue need not
amount to a reluctant acknowledgment of the realities of a bad
situation. There is a strong theoretical basis for viewing law as just
law. According to this view, associated most commonly with the
legal process school, "[f]aw is a doing of something, a purposive
activity, a continuous striving to solve the basic problems of social
148
living."' 147 The court's role is one of "reasoned elaboration"'
promoting the policies and principles of all law. "It can be accepted
as a fixed premise, therefore, that every statute and every doctrine of
unwritten law developed by the decisional process has some kind of
purpose or objective,"' 149 and "each should be applied in ways that
subserve their purposes, as well as the general purposes of the
50
law."'

1

Under this construct, there is plenty of room for Scalia's bete
noire, the heroic common law judge, in statutory interpretation cases.
Although legal-process theory is too grandiose to attribute to the
average American judge and lawyer, my sense is that it is far more
consistent with American legal culture than Scalia's starkly
positivistic textualism. For once, it seems, Scalia is a counter-culture
figure.
Of course, perhaps our legal culture rests on flatly
5
unconstitutional values, at least in the context of federal practice.' '
146. This is not to say that they all have exactly the same practices. Rather,
there is a huge overlapping consensus. For example, legislative history in one
state may be easily accessible and frequently consulted, while virtually
nonexistent in another state. See generally ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT,
supra note 16, at 963-65 (discussing the variation in state courts' reliance on
committee and bill reports).
147. HART & SACKS, supra note 3, at 148.
148. See, e.g., id. at 145.
149. Id. at 148.
150. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to id. at xcii
(summarizing Hart & Sacks's view).
151. The complainant, rather than the traditionalist, bears the burden of
persuasion on this argument. For a constitutional structure argument that
would seemingly mandate textualism, see John F. Manning, DerivingRules of
Statutory Interpretationfrom the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1648,
1776-1806 (2001); Manning, supra note 7. For the contrary perspective, see
William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the
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Perhaps our legal culture's failure to draw a sharp distinction
between federal and state practice is both mistaken and regrettable,
or perhaps the legal culture will evolve in Scalian ways. Indeed, the
recent presidential election may foster the nomination and
confirmation of more judges with similar counter-cultural values.
But it is important to recognize that in the end, justices, like
presidents, have a bully pulpit more than a bull whip. Richard
Neustadt's famous phrase about the seemingly incongruous
impotence of the world's most powerful person-"[p]residential
equally well to
power is the power to persuade"' 52-applies
of the dominant
wind
the
into
howl
they
when
justices
distinguished
legal culture.
Finally, it is ironic that, as Scalia has recognized, the legal
culture provides such a formidable obstacle for the implementation
of textualism. Scalia has continually expressed the view that law
must be distinct from culture, lest it lose its objectivity.' 53
V. CONCLUSION: TRANSFORMATIVE APPOINTMENTS?

I have suggested a number of reasons why interpretive-regime
change, textualist style, faces major obstacles. The first three
barriers-the limited role precedent plays on methodological issues,
the problems of transition and transparency, and the entrenchment of
policy-based canons that are inconsistent with textualism-are
barriers mostly in circumstances in which a relatively small number
of ideologically compatible justices and judges seemingly propose
major changes that are inconsistent with the average American
lawyer's instincts.1 5 4 It is, therefore, the fourth obstacle-the legal
"JudicialPower" in Statutory Interpretation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 99399 (2001).
152. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN
PRESIDENTS 11 (MacMillan Publ'g Co. 1980).
153. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Robert Post has elegantly demonstrated that, despite the efforts of
Scalia and others, public law and culture are inexorably linked. See Robert C.
Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal
Constitution: Culture, Courts, andLaw, 117 HARV. L. REv. 4, 8 (2003).
154. This is by no means an exclusive list of the barriers to textualism. For
example, textualism remains rather vague and unformed in the case law. As
Dan Farber has pointed out to me, it is ironic that, in light of Scalia's essay, a
"common law of textualism" would have to be elaborated. Moreover, as Ed
Rubin has demonstrated, many of the most important federal regulatory
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culture's entrenched nontextualist instincts about the practices of
interpretation-that is key. Without changing the legal culture,
interpretive-regime change is very unlikely.
Textualist warriors have at least three avenues of cultural
challenge. First, they can attack the culture largely from the outside.
Justice Scalia and Professor Manning, for example, epitomize this
technique, contending that under our separation of powers the federal
courts have a role in statutory interpretation that is far more
constrained than the nontextualist common-law mentality.'55 This is
a formal, doctrinal assault on the citadel.
A second line of attack uses the insider's pragmatic approach to
change the tradition. Professor Adrian Vermeule, for example, has
attempted to demonstrate that, from a more functional, less formal
perspective, at least some of the conventional doctrines in statutory
interpretation practice have costs that exceed their benefits. 156 Such
work attempts to persuade the dominant legal culture that, based on
its own pragmatic values, much of the textualist agenda should be
accepted.
The third, and presumably most effective, approach depends
initially on power rather than persuasion--or, more precisely, on
power eventually fueling persuasion. President Bush has had the
opportunity to replace several Justices during his second term. This
157
fact alone is unlikely to cause much of a change in legal culture.
regimes are largely the responsibility of agency, not judicial, enforcement. See
Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 369, 369 (1989). Peter Strauss has built on this insight, noting
that because administrative agencies enjoy political relationships with
congressional committees and the like, such agencies will likely consult and

follow (even if they do not cite) legislative history even if courts decide to
forego that practice. See Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary
Official with Responsibility to Read: Agency Interpretationand the Problem of
Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 321, 322 (1990). Unless textualism
abandons deference to agency interpretation, nontextualist interpretation will
remain a staple of the administrative state. See also Edward L. Rubin,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 3 ISSUES IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 2 (Nov. 2002), at www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art2/
155. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 13; Manning, supranote 144.
156. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74,
77 (2000).
157. For instance, during his confirmation hearings, John Roberts stated:
"I have quoted and looked to legislative history in the past to help determine the meaning of ambiguous terms, and I would expect to follow that same
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The chance of a cultural shift, however, becomes more likely when
coupled with many appointment opportunities in the lower courts.
To be sure, for such a cultural shift to occur, Bush's subordinates,
who are in charge of proposing judicial candidates, would have to
have such matters squarely on their agenda, but there is every reason
Assuming, as is likely, that the
to suppose that they do. 15
Republican-controlled Senate confirms almost all of these ideologically cohesive nominees, the Bush administration could transform
the federal courts.
As Yogi Berra, the philosopher and mystic, said, "It's tough to
make predictions, especially about the future."' 159 Nonetheless, it
seems difficult to imagine that the federal courts are poised to shift
on statutory interpretation as they did during the New Deal. At that
time, a solid majority of like-minded Justices and lower-court judges
changed interpretive practices, eventually influencing state court
practice and legal pedagogy as well. But they did not do so alone.
There was the gradual emergence of an overlapping consensus
among interpretive practice, legal theory, and legal pedagogy that
roughly paralleled basic tenets of the legal-process school. 160 This
fusion of the law's culture, law's abstraction, and law's groundedness seems necessary for interpretive-regime change. Nothing like
that appears to be on the current horizon.
approach on the Supreme Court." Charles Lane, A Conservative, Yes, but Not

a Scalia, WASH.

POST, Sept. 15, 2005, at A13, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/14/
AR2005091402480_pf.html (responding to Sen. Grassley's question, "To
what extent do you share Justice Scalia's view on unreliability of legislative
history?").
158. As Jack Goldsmith put it, "An entire generation of lawyers have
been reared and trained in Justice Scalia's philosophy.... So the Bush
administration is likely to be more successful than its predecessors in finding
Jeffrey Rosen, Can Bush Deliver a
reliably conservative nominees."
Conservative Supreme Court?, N.Y. TiMES, Nov. 14, 2004, § 4, at 12.

159. Yogi Berra Quotes, DIGrrALDREAMDOOR.COM,

at http://www.

digitaldreandoor.com/pages/quotes/yogiberra.html (last visited May 17, 2005).
160. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 150, at lxxvii-lxxxv; Frickey,
supra note 101. This is not to say that there was a consensus about statutory
interpretation theory. Hart & Sacks were right in saying that no theory
adequately explained judicial practice. See HART & SACKS, supra note 3 and
accompanying text. But there were areas of relative consensus: avoidance of
literalism, cautious use of legislative history, purposive enthusiasm for
important legislation, and pragmatic efforts to make statutes fit social context.
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In this light, the question of interpretive-regime change as a
fusion of law's elements gives concrete context to one of Berra's
most famous insights. In what might be called Berra's first existential truth, Yogi stated: "In theory there is no difference between
theory and practice. In practice there is."' 61 It is this exquisite
conundrum-with its Derrida-esque clarity and Buddha-like revelation-that textualism must crack to achieve interpretive-regime
status. At least, as a matter of (purposive) interpretation, I think it is.
How a textualist would understand it, I cannot begin to guess.

161. Yogi Berra Quotes, supra note 159, at http://www.digitaldreamdoor.
com/pages/quotes/yogiberra.html.
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